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The Lost Distinction Between Agency and
Decisional Authority: Unfortunate
Consequences of the Member-Managed

versus Manager-Managed Distinction in the
Limited Liability Company
BY THOMAS E. RUTLEDGE*

I. INTRODUCTION

T

he universe of limited liability companies ("LLCs") is
bifurcated into two species: LLCs that are member-managed
and LLCs that are manager-managed. Under most statutory
formulations, in a member-managed LLC each member, by reason of
their member status, has statutory apparent agency authority to act on
behalf of the LLC. 1 In contrast, in a manager-managed LLC only those
who are designated as managers have statutory apparent agency authority
to act on behalf of the LLC, and members, as members, do not have such
authority. Most statutes provide that either the member-managed or
manager-managed paradigm must be designated in the articles of
organization.
Furthermore, various LLC acts link the internal management
structure to the apparent agency structure. In a member-managed LLC
there is a default rule for internal management by the members, with the
members voting pro-rata, in proportion to capital, or by some other
method of determining relative voting authority. In contrast, in a

* Member, Ogden, Newell & Welch, PLLC (Louisville, Kentucky). The author
thanks Professor Daniel S. Kleinberger (William Mitchell College of Law) and Dean
Allen W. Vestal (University of Kentucky College of Law) for their comments on an
earlier draft of this article and their ongoing diplomatic reminders of some subtle points
of agency law, and to HIP and LCP for their support.
1As used herein, "apparent authority" has the meaning ascribed in the RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY, section 8 (1958) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
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manager-managed LLC the managers are afforded the authority to make
decisions on behalf of the LLC. Ergo, the election made with respect to
external 'apparent agency authority carries with it a default rule regarding
the internal governance of the entity.
The linkage 2' between default agency and default management
structures in 'the LLC has existed since the inception of the structure,

appears in nearly all of the extant statutes, and is derived from the
general ad limited partnership laws that combined to create the LLC, a
hybrid of the two. However, that linkage need not be accepted as integral
to the LLC, and in fact has unfortunate consequences in structuring LLC
operating agreements. Recently the National Conference of Commissions
of Uniform Siate Laws ("NCCUSL"),3 which has undertaken a project to

amend and update the Uniform Limited Liability Company Act
("ULLCA"),4 considered and rejected a proposal to fundamentally alter

ULLCA by eliminating a designated default rule of statutory apparent
agency and de-linking external agency from internal management

structure. Under this prdposal, 1) there would be no requirement that the
articles of organization indicate a member versus manager structure,
2) the statutory. designation of apparent authority would be eliminated,
and 3) the internal management/decisional structure would no longer be
tied, as a default rule, to apparent agency authority. If adopted, this
2 As used herein, "linkage" exclusively refers to the linkage of statutory apparent
authority and decisional authority in various LLC statutes, and does not relate the
"linkage" of the REVISED UNIF. LTD. P'SHuP ACT (amended 1985), 6A U.L.A. 125 (2003)
[hereinafter RULPA] to either the UNIF. P'SHIP ACT, 6 U.L.A. 275 (2001) [hereinafter
UPA] or the UNIF. P'sHtP ACT, 6 U.L.A. 1 (2001) [hereinafter RUPA].
3The National Conference of Commissions on Uniform State Laws ("NCCUSL")
promulgated the Uniform Limited Liability Company Act ("ULLCA") in 1996. UNIF.
LTD. LIAB.,Co. ACT, 6A U.L.A. 553 (2003) [hereinafter ULLCA].
4 Id. ULLCA has to date been adopted in eight states and the U.S. Virgin Islands.
ULLCA was not submitted to any state legislation in 2004, 2005, or 2006. A significant
reason for the relative lack of success of ULLCA was its release after most states had
already adopted their own LLC acts. There seems to exist significant inertia against
change of the newly adopted state acts which combined with the general impression that
ULLCA was not a materially, better product. In 2003, NCCUSL initiated a project to
amend and 'update ULLCA, an effort oft referred to as ReULLCA. However, the "Re"
understates the scope of the project, which is not simply the revision of ULLCA, but the
drafting of an entirely new act based upon current knowledge and experience. The author
is an American Bar Association Section of Business Law Advisor to the ReULLCA
project. However, all, views expressed herein are entirely the author's own, and in no
manner reflect the views of the other American Bar Association Advisors, any of the
NCCUSL Commissioners, or of the ReULLCA drafting committee as a whole.
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proposal would result in ReULLCA moving forward significantly from
virtually all current LLC statutes. But instead of adopting this proposal,
the NCCUSL chose to continue with the historical and generally known
distinction between the member-managed and the manager-managed
LLC and the linkage of that characteristic with the internal decisional
structure of the entity.5
The objective of this article is to identify certain issues that have
arisen from the linkage of statutory apparent agency and decisional
structure, using the rejected ReULLCA proposal as a means of exploring
a possible resolution of the matter. As there is little (if
any) likelihood
that the linkage between agency and decisional authority will be
eliminated from LLC law any time soon (if ever), it is important to
appreciate the issues that flow from the joinder of the two and some of
the drafting challenges that are engendered thereby.
II. APPARENT AGENCY AUTHORITY IN THE MEMBER-MANAGED
VERSUS MANAGER-MANAGED LLC

In the context of the LLC, "apparent agency" refers to the power to
act on behalf of an LLC where that authority arises not from a specific
delegation from the LLC (the principal) to an agent, but rather from the
actions of the LLC toward the world at large. The two broad models of
LLC structure are "member-managed" and "manager-managed," and
these models are based upon different paradigms of statutory apparent
agency authority to act on behalf of an LLC. 6 In the former, each

5 See infra notes 46-56 and accompanying text. General rules of agency as applied
to apparent authority apply to the exercise of this authority, and the members can be
subject to the liability of an agent that acts outside the appropriate limits of that authority.
6 Recall that in questions of apparent authority, it is the actions of the principal to the

third party, and not the actions of the agent to the third party, that control. RESTATEMENT,
supra note 1, at §§ 8 cmt. a, 27; see also id. § 49(a). It is possible for an agent to create
the required manifestation of the principal's desire that the agent act on its behalf This
situation arises where the agent accurately describes to a third party the existence and
limits of the authority held. Id. § 27 cmt. c. In contrast, actual authority arises out of the
conduit of the principal to the agent. Id. § 26. What activities do or do not fall within the
"ordinary course of business" is a fact-dependent question for which the limited case law
is of little benefit. See, e.g., In re Avalon Hotel Partners, L.L.C., 302 B.R. 377 (Bankr. D.

Or. 2003) (filing bankruptcy is a "major decision" requiring consent of seventy-five
percent of the members); J.M. Equip. & Transp., Inc. v. Gemstone, L.L.C., No. CV
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member, as a member, has apparent agency to act on behalf of the LLC
in the ordinary course of the LLC's business. In doing so, the LLC
utilizes the agency rule that existed in partnerships formed under the

Uniform Partnership Act of 1914, under which each partner, as a partner,
had agency authority to act on behalf of the partnership within the

ordinary course of business.' Consequently, the member-managed LLC

9662031, 1998 WL 573255 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 25, 1998) (LLC was obligated for
costs of repair and transportation of a bulldozer requested by one member of the LLC,
there having been no objection to and partial payment thereon by other member); Triple
Rock, L.L.C. v. A.C. Rainey, No. M2000-01115-COA-R3-CV, 2003 WL 21338702
(Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 7, 2003) (member of member-managed real estate dealer LLC had
apparent agency authority to direct disposition of sales commissions and to direct
payment of LLC funds to satisfaction of LLC's obligation.) ; EZ Auto, L.L.C. v. H.M. Jr.
Auto Sales, No. 04-01-00820-CV, 2002 WL 1758315 (Tex. App. July 31, 2002)
(manager of LLC in the automobile dealer industry had apparent authority to enter into an
agreement to purchase automobiles from a third party); ALAN R. BROMBERG & LARRY E.
RIBSTEIN, BROMBERG AND RIBSTEIN ON PARTNERSHIP §§ 4.02-4.03 (1998).
7 See, e.g., Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. [hereinafter K.R.S.] § 275.135(1) (Banks-Baldwin
2004):
Except as provided in subsection (2) of this section, every member shall
be an agent of the limited liability company for the purpose of its business or
affairs, and the act of any member, including, but not limited to, the execution
in the name of the limited liability company of any instrument, for apparently
carrying on in the usual way the business or affairs of the limited liability
company of which he is a member, shall bind the limited liability company,
unless the member so acting has, in fact, no authority to act for the limited
liability company in the particular matter, and the person with whom the
member is dealing has knowledge or has received notification of the fact that
the member has no such authority.
Id.; OR. REv. STAT. § 63.140(l)(a) (2003); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1021(A) (Michie
2004); PROTOTYPE LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 301(a) (1994) [hereinafter PROTOTYPE LLC
ACT]; ULLCA, supra note 3, § 301(a)(1).
See UPA, supra note 2, at sections 9(l)-(2), which provide:
(1) Every partner is an agent of the partnership for the purpose of its
business, and the act of every partner, including the execution in the
partnership name of any instrument, for apparently carrying on in the usual way
the business of the partnership of which he is a member binds the partnership,
unless the partner so acting has in fact no authority to act for the partnership in
the particular matter, and the person with whom he is dealing has knowledge of
the fact that he has no such authority.
(2) An act of a partner which is not apparently for the carrying on of the
business of the partnership in the usual way does not bind the partnership
unless authorized by the other partners.
Id. The UPA has been revised and superseded by RUPA. The RUPA provision equivalent
to UPA section 9 is section 301, which provides for the general apparent agency of all
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is sometimes referred to as the "partnership model." In contrast, in the
manager-managed LLC, only those named as "managers" have apparent
agency authority to act on behalf of the entity, and the members, as
members, have no agency authority. 9 As there is no requirement that the

partners, subject to the limitations permitted by the Statement of Authority as provided
for in RUPA section 303, which states:
Subject to the effect of a statement of partnership authority under section 303:
(1) Each partner is an agent of the partnership for the purpose of its
business. An act of a partner, including the execution of an instrument in the
partnership name, for apparently carrying on in the ordinary course the
partnership business or business of the kind carried on by the partnership binds
the partnership, unless the partner had no authority to act for the partnership in
the particular matter and the person with whom the partner was dealing knew
or had received a notification that the partner lacked authority.
(2) An act of a partner which is not apparently for carrying on in the
ordinary course the partnership business or business of the kind carried on by
the partnership binds the partnership only if the act was authorized by the other
partners.
RUPA, supra note 2, § 303.
9 See, e.g., K.R.S. § 275.135(2):
If the articles of organization provide that management of the limited
liability company is vested in a manager or managers: (a) No member, solely
by reason of being a member, shall be an agent of the limited liability
company; and (b) Every manager shall be an agent of the limited liability
company for the purpose of its business or affairs, and the act of any manager,
including, but not limited to, the execution in the name of the limited liability
company of any instrument, for apparently carrying on in the usual way the
business or affairs of the limited liability company of which he is the manager
shall bind the limited liability company, unless the manager so acting has, in
fact, no authority to act for the limited liability company in the particular
matter, and the person with whom the manager is dealing has knowledge or has
received notification of the fact that the manager has no such authority.
Id.; ALA. CODE § 10-12-21 (2004); IOWA CODE § 490A.702.3 (2004); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 63.140(2); VA. CODE ArN. § 13.1-1021(B); PROTOTYPE LLC ACT, supra note 7, § 301;
ULLCA, supra note 3, § 301. The Colorado LLC Act provides that only "managers" may
incur debts or liabilities on behalf of the LLC while providing that "'manager' means any
member" where the LLC is member-managed. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-80-407, 780-102(8) (West 2004). If a member is named as a manager, that person will have agency
authority, but only in the latter role and without respect to the former. A departure from
this general statement is Delaware, which provides that absent a contrary provision in the
operating agreement, "each member and [each] manager has the authority to bind the
limited liability company." DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 6, § 18-402 (2004). See also infra notes
66-69 and accompanying text (for a discussion of the Delaware approach to this issue).
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managers be members,' l the manager-managed LLC affords the
opportunity for the complete separation of ownership and agency
authority. This model is sometimes referred to as the "corporate model"
because ownership (member or shareholder) is entirely separated from
agency authority (manager or officer)."1
The distinction between the member-managed and the managermanaged LLC has existed since the inception of the form and exists for
reasons that are in part based upon the then-applicable tax classification
regulations. Prior to January 1, 1997, under the then-controlling
"Kintner" tax classification regulations, 12 the election of a managermanaged structure led to the LLC having "centralized management" and
made it more difficult for the LLC to be classified as a partnership. 3 The
member-managed option and its retention of member agency authority
made classification as a partnership, the desired outcome in the
overwhelming majority of cases, far more likely. Effective January 1,
1997, the so-called "Check-the-Box" classification regulations were
adopted, 14 thus eliminating the impact of agency structure on the issue of
tax classification

10See,

e.g., ALA. CODE § 10-12-22(b)(2); K.R.S. § 275.165(2)(b); OR. REV. STAT.

§ 63.001(19); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1024(B); PROTOTYPE LLC ACT, supra note 7,
§ 401(B)(2); ULLCA, supranote 3, § 101(10).
11 See 1 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE

CORPORATIONS § 30 nn.8-9 (2004); 5 id., § 2098 nn.5, 8-12. It could also be said that the
apparent agency authority of a member in a manager-managed LLC is equivalent to that
of a limited partner in a limited partnership formed under the RULPA. See RULPA,
supra note 2, § 303(a). However, this may overstate the case, as under RULPA
sections 303(a) and (d) a limited partner who was held out as a general partner, such as
by the exercise of agency authority, was subject to the loss of limited liability. No such
loss of limited liability exists for an LLC member. It should be noted that the "corporate
model" moniker is limited to describing the separation of ownership and apparent agency
and does not suggest that a "corporate model" LLC is otherwise equivalent to a
corporation.
12Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-1 to 301.7704-2 (repealed Jan. 1, 1997).
13See Thomas E. Rutledge & Lady E. Booth, The Limited Liability Company Act:
UnderstandingKentucky's New OrganizationalOption, 83 Ky. L.J. 1, 79-83 & nn.37994 (1995). See also Rev. Rul. 93-6, 1993-1 C.B. 229 (discussing "Kintner" characteristic
of centralized management in the context of the classification of an LLC formed under
the Colorado Limited Liability Company Act).
14 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2 (adopted by T.D. 8697, 61 Fed. Reg. 6684 (Dec. 18,
1996) (effective Jan. 1, 1997)).
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The initial LLC Act, adopted in Wyoming in 1977,15 provided that
each LLC must either be member-managed or manager-managed. Under
this bulletproof statute, 16 the default rule was that the LLC would be
member-managed, and it was mandated that the articles of organization
state whether the LLC was member- or manager-managed. 17 In the next
series of LLC acts, Colorado mandated that the LLC be manager-

managed, and did not provide that the LLC could be membermanaged, 1t while the Minnesota LLC Act provided for a corporate
structure including a board of directors and other governance
mechanisms drawn from the Minnesota corporations statute.' 9 However,
these statutes were atypical; 20 nearly all other states have adopted acts

"5WYO.STAT. ANN. § 17-15-101 (Michie 1989) (effective June 30, 1977). Prior to
the Wyoming Act, an LLC act had been proposed, but not enacted, in Alaska. H.R. 403,
9th Leg. (Alaska 1975). The proponents of the Wyoming LLC bill were those who had
been unsuccessful in Alaska. See Thomas E. Geu, Understanding the Limited Liability
Company: A Basic ComparativePrime (Pt. 1), 37 S.D. L. REV. 44,48 (1992).
16Early LLC Acts were "bulletproof' in that they mandated structural points that
would insure the federal tax classification of the entity as a partnership under the then
prevailing "Kintner" classification regulations. See generally Charles W. Murdock,
Limited Liability Companies in the Decade of the 1990s: Legislative and Case Law
Developments and Their Implications for the Future, 56 Bus. LAW. 499 n.17-18 and
accompanying text (Feb. 2001).
17The second LLC Act, adopted by Florida in 1982, was likewise bulletproof and
was patterned on the Wyoming Act. FLA. STAT. ch. 608.401-71 (effective Apr. 21, 1982).
18See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7-80-401(1) (West Supp. 1993); see also Rev. Rul.
93-6, 1993-I C.B. 229; Robert Keatinge et al., Colorado Enacts Limited Liability
Legislation, 19 COLO. LAW., No. 6, at 1029 (June 1990). Other exceptions are:
Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 2013, 2015 (West Supp. 1994); Texas, TEX.
REV. Civ. STAT. ANN., art. 1582n, § 2.12 (Vernon 1994) (reversing the typical regime by
vesting management in elected managers but allowing the articles of organization to
transfer management to the members).
19 MINN. STAT. § 322B.606 (1993); see also CARTER G. BISHOP & DANIEL S.
7.02-.04
KLEINBERGER, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES: TAX AND BUSINESS LAW,
(Warren Gorham & Lamont, 1994 Supp. 2004-2); Daniel S. Kleinberger & Carter G.
Bishop, Reporters' Notes - 1992 to Minn. Stat. § 322B.01 (Overview Comments, Major
Differences Between the Minnesota Limited Liability Company Act and the Minnesota
Business Corporation Act (Chapter 302A), Relevance of Chapter 302A in Interpreting
and Applying Chapter 322B). Other examples of the corporate structure in LLC acts are:
N.D.'CENT. CODE § 10-31-69(a) (2004) (North Dakota); and TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-238101(a)(2) (2004) (Tennessee).
20 In 1994, the Colorado LLC Act was amended to provide that LLCs formed
thereunder could be member-managed or manager-managed. COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-80401 (2004), revised by SB 94-107, Chapter 139 of Laws of 1994; see also Risa Lynn
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allowing both member- and manager-managed LLCs. 2' Notice of the
model selected is typically required to be recited in the articles of
organization,22 thereby giving third parties at least the opportunity of
discovering the apparent agency structure. However, states differ on the
notice effect of the articles of organization. For example, the Kentucky
LLC Act contains no express provision regarding the notice effect of the
articles of organization. The Delaware LLC Act states that the filing of
the certificate of formation is notice of both the organization of the LLC
and the facts required to be set forth in the certificate under Delaware
law.2 3 The Illinois LLC Act provides that "The fact that the articles of
organization are on file in the Office of the Secretary of State is notice
that the limited liability company is a limited liability company and is
notice of all other facts set forth therein." 24 The Colorado LLC Act, prior
to its amendment in 2004, provided that the articles were notice of all
facts that were required or expressly permitted to be set forth therein; 25 a
similar provision appears in the Florida LLC Act as well.26 But,
irrespective of formulation, it is all a legal fiction. Everyday transactions
do not involve due diligence on the part of the apparent agent (or the one
representing himself as the apparent agent).27

Wolf-Smith, ColoradoLLCs: New and Improved, 23 COLO. LAW., No. 7, at 1473 (July
1994).
21 See generally LARRY E. RIBSTEIN & ROBERT R. KEATINGE, 1 RIBSTEIN AND
KEATINGE ON LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES § 8, Appendix 8-2 (2d ed. 2004).
22 See, e.g., K.R.S. § 275.025(1)(d) (Banks-Baldwin 2004); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 63.047(l)(d) (2003); PROTOTYPE LLC ACT, supra note 7, § 202(d); ULLCA, supra note
3, § 203(a)(6). By way of contrast, the Virginia LLC Act does not require the article of
organization to set forth whether the LLC is member- or manager-managed. VA. CODE
ANN. § 13.1-1011 (Michie 2004). The Delaware LLC Act does not require the certificate
of formation (the Delaware nomenclature for articles of organization) to recite whether
the LLC is member- or manager-managed or to otherwise make for public record any
limitation on authority made in accordance with state law. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-

402 (2004).

23 Tit. 6, § 18-207. The Delaware LLC Act does not mandate that the certificate of

formation recite whether the LLC is member- or manager-managed, and, as such, a
statement as to that distinction in the certificate of formation is not deemed "notice." Id.
180/5-70 (West 2004).
25 COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-80-208. As amended, section 7-80-208 provides that the
24 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. §

articles of organization are notice of only the facts required to be set forth therein.
26 FLA. STAT. ch. 608.407(5) (2004).

27 A further limitation on the utility of this declaration is that it is often not available
on the Secretary of State websites. For example, while the websites of the Iowa, Utah,
and South Dakota Secretaries of State provide information on the name, registered office,
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In either the member-managed or the manager-managed LLC, the
entity may at any time designate a particular agent with actual authority
irrespective of that agent's position as either a member, a manager, or as
neither. For example, in a member-managed LLC the members could
adopt a resolution authorizing a non-member to execute a deed
transferring the LLC's real property and that agent, having been granted
actual authority to act, may fully bind the LLC and properly transfer the
property. Furthermore, assuming that the LLC act and the applicable
operating agreement so allowed, that grant of authority from the
members to the third-party agent would be effective even where the LLC
is manager-managed. As such, grants of actual authority to act on behalf
of the LLC are not constrained by the statutory apparent agency afforded
by the member- versus manager-managed distinction.28
To date, this somewhat indefinite structure for apparent agency has
been generally accepted by the constituencies that make use of the LLC
form. Where apparent agency authority in each of the members is
acceptable, as is often the case in a professional practice, the membermanaged paradigm is selected. Where centralized agency is desired, such
as where a real estate venture is structured as an LLC having an active
promoter and a significant number of passive members, the managermanaged paradigm is chosen. When combined with the ability to appoint
actual agents to supplement the statutory apparent authority, the system
has at least been workable. But there are limitations; for instance, it is
unclear whether the LLC can limit the apparent authority of a person
within the class of those holding statutory apparent authority.29 While

and date of formation of an LLC, none list whether it is member-managed or managermanaged. It was only in 2004 that the Kentucky Secretary of State's website began
noting whether the LLC is member- or manager-managed. A website which resembles
that of the Oregon Secretary of State is most helpful; it lists whether the LLC is memberor manager-managed and lists the names and addresses of the members and, if any, the
managers.
28 See, e.g., commentary to PROTOTYPE LLC ACT, supra note 7, § 301.
29Section 303 of RUPA provides for a Statement of Authority that can serve to limit
the apparent authority of a partner in a partnership. RUPA, supra note 2, § 303. To date,
the various LLC acts have not adopted a filing mechanism by which the apparent
authority of a member or manager otherwise having apparent authority may be limited or
eliminated. A proposed amendment to the Florida LLC Act, pending as this article goes
to press, would allow the articles of organization to "describe any limitations upon the

authority of a manager or managing member." S.B. 1056, § 3 (proposing to amend Fla.
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such limitations may be imposed by private ordering, those limitations
on. authority are not binding on a third par.ty who has not received
notice. 30 That said, it is clear that when a member acts outside the scope
of his actual'authority as limited by private ordering, but within the scope
of his statutory~ appairent authority, the LLC, and in some instances the
other members, will have a claim-against the acting member. As such, if
a manager is constrained in the operating agreement or another private
ordering in such, a waythat his authority is limited to obligations having
a value of $500 or less, even while agreements of a greater value would
be in the ordinary course of business, the execution of an agreement
binding the LLC in excess of $500 would still be enforceable against the
LLC (assuming the third party did not have actual notice of the limitation
on the manager's authority). At the same time, the LLC (and in some
cases the members) would 'have a claim for damages against that
manager for the consequences of the' agreement entered into outside of
his authority.
III.

THE DEFAULT DECISIONAL AUTHORITY STRUCTURE THAT

FOLLOWS FROM THE MEMBER-MANAGED VERSUS MANAGERMANAGED ELECTION

Flowing from the election of a default rule of apparent agency
authority is the election of the internal governance structure of the LLC.

Stat. § 608.407 (introduced Jan. 27, 2005)). It is not clear, and to date no LLC act has
expressly provided, that the statement in the articles of organization regarding the
member- versus manager-managed structure may go on to limit the apparent authority of
those agents. The efficacy of such a limitation may be state-law specific, especially as it
relates to the notice effect of the articles of organization. At a meeting held in November,
2003, the NCCUSL ReULLCA. drafting committee decided to look into a mechanism
similar to the RUPA. Statement of Authority for the new LLC Act. As of this date, it is
not yet decided whether such a mechanism, if incorporated in ReULLCA, would be
limited to a grant of express authority or also include the ability to limit the apparent
authority granted in the articles of organization.
30 See, e.g., K.R.S. §§ 275.135(1), 275.135(2)(b), 275.135(4) (Banks-Baldwin
2004); ALA. CODE §§ 10-12-21(a), 10-12-21(b)(2), 10-12-21(d) (2004); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 63.140(1), (2)(a) (2003); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1021.1(A)(2), (B)(3) (Michie'2004);
PROTOTYPE LLC ACT, supra note 7, § 301(a), 301(b)(2); ULLCA, supra note 3,
§ 301(a)(1), (b)(1); see also Capital Salvage v. Chicago.Title Co., No. B167757, 2004
WL 1753213 (Cal. App. 2 Dist. Aug. 5, 2004) (escrow agent not liable for relying upon
signature of LLC's manager in the execution of escrow agreement and instructions, there
being no independent obligation to ascertain manager's authority).
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In most statutory formulations, the member-managed LLC is directly
managed by the members, vesting in them the authority to direct the
day-to-day and extraordinary activities of the business. In this
circumstance, default rules vary regarding the relative voting power of
the various members 31 and the voting thresholds 'required to approve a
particular action.32 In contrast, in the manager-managed LLC, the
statutory default is that the managers have the authority to manage at
least the ordinary, and in some instances the extraordinary, 33 course of
business of the LLC, with little if any decisional authority left to the
members.
And here arise the problems. In some instances, poor statutory

drafting has conveyed to the managers power and authority that was
neither properly considered nor intended.34 Even where these languagespecific problems are not present, there are ongoing debates regarding
which activities fall within the purview of the managers and which

31 For example, members may vote per capita (one member, one vote). See, e~g.,
PROTOTYPE LLC ACT, supra note 7, § 403(a); ULLCA, supra note 3, § 404(a)(1). They
may vote in proportion to their capital (per capital). See, e.g., K.R.S. § 275.175(3); VA.
CODE ANN. § 13.1-1022(B). Or they may vote on some other basis. See, e.g., COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 7-80-706(1) (2004). The various LLC acts generally provide that the
operating agreement may provide alternative means of allocating voting power, examples
of which include non-voting interests in the LLC or units with veto power over ordinary
or extraordinary transactions. See, e.g., K.R.S. § 275.175(1) ("Unless otherwise provided
in the articles of organization, a written operating agreement .... ); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 13.1-1022(F) ("The articles of organization or an operating agreement may provide for
classes or groups of members having such relative rights, powers, and duties as the
articles of organization or an operating agreement may provide. ..").
32 For example, an act may provide a default rule of a majority of the members
(however measured) to approve ordinary course transactions and unanimous approval for
extraordinary transactions.
" See, e.g., K.R.S. § 275.175(l)-(2) (placing business affairs of LLC under control
of the managers while reserving to the members the power to vote upon amendments to
written operating agreement, approval of an action in contravention of a written operating
agreement and certain amendments to the articles of organization).
34As a result of poor drafting, under the Kentucky LLC Act there is the possibility
that the managers could amend an oral operating agreement or adopt amendments to the
articles.of organization that do not deal with the member- or manager-managed options.
See K.R.S. §§ 275.030, 275.175. Prior to its recent revision, the Colorado LLC Act, by
means of addressing the removal of a manager, could be used to authorize the expulsion
of a member by a vote of a majority of the members. COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-80120(8), 7-80-401(2), 7-80-405.

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 93

activities remain within the control of the members.35 Avoiding these
ambiguities imposes costs in the form of greater detail in the drafting of
the operating agreement, costs that are not avoidable by relying on the
statute. The fact that some portion of the existing ambiguity can be
ascribed to the "growing pains" of a relatively new business structure in
no manner minimizes the actuality of the costs imposed on those
suffering its consequences. Inter se allocations of authority will almost
always involve a degree of private ordering. Increasing the required
amount of private ordering by a confusing and poorly fitted statutory
allocation only exacerbates the problem.
IV. THE REAL WORLD

OF

LLC DECISIONAL

STRUCTURES AND

APPARENT AGENCY

A significant fact that is ignored in the member-managed versus
manager-managed LLC paradigm is that decisional authority and agency
authority are independent attributes that should not necessarily be linked
together. Apparent agency authority need not involve a grant of authority
to make managerial decisions on behalf of the principal; likewise, the
authority to make managerial decisions on behalf of an entity need not be
accompanied by a grant of apparent authority to carry out those
decisions.3 6 The predominant paradigm for LLCs links the two. This
linkage is without obvious benefit, yet it has obvious costs and
limitations.
Consider the following typical example of the formation of an LLC.
A group of six individuals with complimentary strengths in a particular
type of consulting decide to join forces. Operating collectively, they can
offer an integrated product and better compete for consulting contracts.
They decide that the common vehicle through which they will offer this
integrated suite of services will be an LLC. Each member will be
responsible for the delivery of those services for which he or she has
particular expertise. Once a contract is in place, each of the members,

35See, e.g., Apple Glen Crossing, L.L.C. v. Trademark Retail, Inc., 784 N.E.2d 484,
486 (Ind. 2003) ("change orders," not "major decisions," requiring approval of all of the
members); Chase Manhattan Bank v. Iridium African Corp., 197 F. Supp. 2d 120 (D. Del
2002) (attestation as to proper amendment of the operating agreement not' an ordinary
matter).
36See supra note 11 (separation in corporation of agency authority from board's

decisional authority).
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when dealing with the client, will have agency authority on behalf of the
LLC. However, all decisions regarding the operation of the LLC,
including the decision on the terms of a bid for a contract, will be made
by at least a majority of the members. One member, in addition to
rendering services in the consultant capacity, will have responsibilities
that include acting as the "business manager" for the LLC. For example,
this business manager will bear the responsibility of dealing with the
landlord for the LLC's offices.
In this instance,3 7 the LLC ("Typical LLC") is set up as a managermanaged LLC with the "business manager" member named as the
manager. That member, identified as a manager for ease of dealing with
third parties in the ordinary course of business, is thereby imbued with
apparent agency on behalf of all company operations. At the same time,
none of the other members has statutorily derived apparent authority to
deal with any third parties, including those organizations to which the
members are rendering services. Rather, the LLC operating agreement
must provide that each member will have the actual authority to
represent the LLC to clients, and each individual consulting agreement
must specify, and thereby place the client on notice, that each member
has actual agency authority. According to the operating agreement,
consulting agreements may be entered into with clients only with the
consent of a majority of the members. But third-party clients, unaware of
this limitation upon the "manager's" apparent authority, may rely upon
the manager's ability to bind Typical LLC to any agreement in the
ordinary course.
Could the members have decided to structure Typical LLC as a
member-managed entity? Certainly they had that option, with the
consequence that each member would have the apparent agency
authority described above for the manager. Another consequence is that
every member would have the apparent authority to bind Typical LLC to
third parties in its ordinary course of business; in that case, the
consultants lose the centralization of authority that was a product of the
decision to use a manager-managed structure.38
37 These facts are a slightly modified version of an operating agreement structured
by another member of the ReULLCA drafting committee.
38In the member managed structure, the operating agreement could specify that the
members would act by majority (or some other defined threshold), and that no member
would have actual authority when acting without such consent, but such is not binding
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A third option is available as well: use of a manager-managed
structure in which every member is also a manager, investing in each a
manager's apparent agency authority. 39 This structure, however, simply
duplicates the problems that exist in the member-managed option, but
now under the guise of manager apparent agency rather than member
apparent agency.
What is missing from the statute is a default paradigm that
accommodates the expectations and desires of the persons forming
Typical LLC. What exists is a pair of alternative default structures,
neither of which is satisfactory to the members of Typical LLC, each of
which imposes costs that could be avoided if LLC statutes were to
1) provide a different structure for the apparent agency authority to act
on behalf of an LLC and 2) de-link apparent agency authority and
decisional authority.
This is not the only problem with the current paradigm of statutory
apparent agency. There is also the issue of changes in the managerial
structure. Imagine a situation in which a third-party has done business
with a member-managed LLC through a number of transactions. 40 The
LLC is organized in a state that requires a declaration of "membermanaged" or "manager-managed" in its articles of organization, and
state law also provides that the articles are notice of the facts set forth
therein. The LLC then decides to alter its structure, elects to become
manager-managed, and makes the necessary amendment to its articles of
organization, which now provide:
The management of the limited liability company is reserved to
managers elected and/or appointed in accordance with the operating
agreement of the limited liability company. Only those elected or
appointed as managers may bind the limited liability company, and no
member, by reason of being a member, may bind the limited liability
company. The authority of the managers shall be exercised in

upon third parties without notice. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
39 This structure is equivalent, from the standpoint of apparent agency, to membermanagement, but perhaps has tax consequences for purposes of the passive activity rules,

self-employment taxes, and other provisions of the tax code. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 467, 1402
(2004).
40

The third party has properly relied upon the authority of the member with whom it
deals, as the transactions are "for apparently carrying on in the ordinary course the
[LLC's] business." ULLCA, supra note 3, § 301(a)(1).
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accordance with the operating agreement of the limited liability
company.

There exists no obligation that the LLC, or the member who has
previously represented it to the third party, deliver to the third party a
copy of that amendment. Rather, at least within the confines of the LLC
act, the accepted fiction is that filing the amendment to the articles of
organization provides notice to the third party of the changed
management structure. Further assume that the member with whom the
third party has previously dealt is not elected a manager. That member
no longer has statutory apparent agency authority to act on behalf of the
LLC. 4 1 Sometime thereafter, the non-manager member with whom that
third party has always dealt purports to enter into a transaction with the
third party on behalf of the LLC. However, as that member lacked both
statutory apparent and actual agency authority to act on behalf of the
LLC, the LLC has statutory authority for the position that it is not bound
by that action even if it was in the ordinary course of the LLC's
business.
This result follows from the fact that apparent agency exists based
on the relation of the principal to the third party,43 and it is the articles of
organization that are the manifestation of those actions in the memberor manager-managed (represented) designation. So the fact that the
member did not tell the third party of the change in management
structure does not alter the fact that the previously existing authority had
been revoked. Admittedly, it may be possible for that third party to argue
that there existed lingering apparent authority pursuant to which the LLC
should be bound, but such a reference is outside the scope of the LLC's
organizational law and the statutory basis by which the LLC designated
who does (and does not) have agency authority to act on its behalf.44

41

See, e.g., K.R.S. § 275.165(2) (Banks-Baldwin 2004); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-

1021.1(B)(1) (Michie 2004); PROTOTYPE LLC ACT, supra note 7, § 301(B)(1); ULLCA,

supra note 3, § 301(b)(1).
42 This result follows from the two-part effect on apparent agency of the managermanaged election: the "managers" are afforded statutory authority while the members,

qua members, are denied authority. See supra note 9.
43 See supra note 6.
44 This problem of lingering apparent authority exists as well in the partnership and
the limited partnership contexts. Under the prior RULPA, while there was a requirement
that the general partners be named in the certificate of limited partnership, the fact that a
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This is not to say that the members in a member-managed or the
manager in a manager-managed LLC are the only persons who can be its
apparent agents. Assume Bob's Bar is a single-member LLC with Bob
as the sole member. Scott works at the bar but is neither a member nor a
manager. One day he places an order with Beth, a liquor saleswoman, to
deliver a case of fine Kentucky small-batch bourbon. After the delivery,
Bob reprimands Scott, reminding him that only Bob should be ordering
stock. Still, Bob pays the invoice and the bourbon is wildly popular with
the customers. By paying the invoice, Bob ratified the initial transaction
and, by paying the invoice without bringing Scott's lack of authority to
Beth's attention, has indicated to Beth that Scott did have authority to
act. This invests Scott with the apparent authority to place further orders
with Beth in the future. An express revocation of that authority, delivered
to deprive Scott of the apparent, albeit not statutory,
to Beth, is required
45
agency authority.
We are left in a most unsatisfactory position. The LLC act itself
provides alternative default agency rules that have unsatisfactory
consequences for management structure. The apparent agency rules are
unsatisfactory for both the LLC and for third parties since they are likely
ineffective at truly limiting apparent authority to those the LLC may
from time to time choose as its agents. The LLC must be continually
aware of the creeping designation of apparent agents arising in the
ordinary course of business under generally applicable rules of agency
law. And the possibility of confusing third parties who deal with LLCs
continues unabated.

V.

THE REJECTED REULLCA PROPOSAL

In 2003, the ReULLCA drafting committee conceived, considered,
and, with the input of the entire NCCUSL, eventually rejected a proposal
that would have provided that the new ULLCA would eliminate the

person or entity was not named as a general partner did not constitute notice that they

were not a general partner, and as such the limited partnership could have statutory
apparent agents not named in the certificate of limited partnership. See RULPA, supra
note 2, § 201(a)(3). Recent statutory efforts to address this issue include the RUPA
section 704 Statement of Dissociation.
45 This is not a case of acquiescence giving rise to actual authority, as the agent has
been told by the principal that he acted outside the scope of his authority. See, e.g.,
RESTATEMENT, supra note i, § 33.
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alternative member versus manager apparent agency structures, while at
the same time eliminating the linkage between apparent agency and
decisional authority. Currently, ULLCA addresses the alternative agency
structures in section 301(a)-(b), which provide:
(a) Subject to subsections (b) and (c):

(1) Each member is an agent of the limited liability company for
the purpose of its business, and an act of a member, including the
signing of an instrument in the company's name, for apparently
carrying on in the ordinary course the company's business or
business of the kind carried on by the company binds the
company, unless the member had no authority to act for the
company in the particular matter and the person with whom the
member was dealing knew or had notice that the member lacked
authority.
(2) An act of a member which is not apparently for carrying on in
the ordinary course the company's business or business of the kind
carried on by the company binds the company only if the act was
authorized by the other members.
(b) Subject to subsection (c), in a manager-managedcompany:

(1) A member is not an agent of the company for the purpose of its
business solely by reason of being a member. Each manager is an
agent of the company for the purpose of its business, and an act of
a manager, including the signing of an instrument in the
company's name, for apparently carrying on in the ordinary course
the company's business or business of the kind carried on by the
company binds the company, unless the manager had no authority

to act for the company in the particular matter and the person with
whom the manager was dealing knew or had notice that the
manager lacked authority.
(2) An act of a manager which is not apparently for carrying on in
the ordinary course the company's business or business of the kind

carried on by the company binds the company only if the act was
authorized under Section 404.46

46

ULLCA, supra note 3, § 301(a)-(b). The equivalent provision to ULLCA section
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In the proposed.ReULLCA formulation, the options of vesting
apparent agency authority in either the members or the managers is
abandoned, and members qua members would not have agency
authority. Rather: "[a] member does not have the right or
47 the power as a
member to act for or bind the limited liability company.
At the same time, it was proposed that the requirement that the
articles of organization reciting the management/agency 48 be eliminated.
No affirmative statement as to who would have apparent agency
authority was substituted in place of this previously required declaration.
Rather, the LLC, in its articles of organization, would be permitted, but
not obligated; to make provision for persons with actual agency authority
on behalf of the LLC.4 9 The proposal then addressed the binding effect of
such a declaration of agency authority. 50 Under this proposed formula, an

301 in the Prototype LLC Act is section 301. See also K.R.S. § 275.135; VA. CODE ANN.
§ 13.1-1021.1(A), (B).

147'ULLCA Annual Meeting Draft at 41 [hereinafter 2003 ULLCA Proposal]
(discussion of proposed § 301) (copy on file with author).
48 See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
49See 2003 ULLCA Proposal, supra note 47, at 40, stating that the new section
203(b) would provide:
(b) The articles of organization may delineate the authority of any person to:
(1) transfer real property held in the name of the limited liability company;
(2) enter into other transactions on behalf of the limited liability company or to
otfierwise act for the limited liability company in interactions with persons who
are not members or transferees.
Id. See also id. at 41, stating that new section 203(e) would provide:
(e) A delineation under subsection (b) may:
(1)identify a particular person or may refer to a position that exists in or with
respect to the limited liability company; and
(2) state authority, limit authority or negate authority, or any do any
combination.

Id.
50 See id. at 40-41, stating that the new section 203(c) and (d) would provide:
(c) A delineation under subsection (b)(1):
(1) provides notice of its contents to all persons;
(2) is conclusive in favor of any person that gives value without knowledge to
the contrary; and.
(3) is conclusive against the limited liability company in favor of a person that
has not given value if the person:
(i) is not a member or a transferee, and
(ii) relies on the delineation with knowledge to the contrary.
(d) A delineation under subsection (b)(2) does not by itself provide notice of its
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LLC that made no provision for a specific grant of agency in its articles
of organization would, as to the public record, be without an indicated
agency structure. Actual and apparent agents would arise from time to
time in accordance with general agency law.
Addressing decisional authority at section 404(a)-(b), ULLCA
currently provides:
(a) In a member-managed company:
(1) each member has equal rights in the management and conduct
of the company's business; and
(2) except as otherwise provided in subsection (c), any matter
relating to the business of the company may be decided by a
majority of the members.
(b) In a manager-managed company:
(1) each manager has equal rights in the management and conduct
of the company's business;
(2) except as otherwise provided in subsection (c), any matter
relating to the business of the company may be exclusively
decided by the manager or, if there is more than one manager, by a
majority of the managers; and
(3) a manager:
(i) must be designated, appointed, elected, removed, or
replaced by a vote, approval, or consent of a majority of the
members; and
(ii) holds office until a successor has been elected and
qualified, unless the manager sooner resigns or is removed. 5'
The 2003 ReULLCA Proposal regarding management's decisional
authority over the activities of an LCC provided:

contents but is conclusive against the limited liability company in favor of a
person that:
(i) is not a member or a transferee, and
(ii) relies on the delineation without knowledge to the contrary.
Id.
S ULLCA, supra note 3, § 404(a)-(b). The equivalent provision in the PROTOTYPE
LLC ACT, supra note 7, is section 401(b)(3). See also K.R.S. § 275.165(2)(c);.ALA. CODE
§§ 10-12-21(b)(2), 10-12-22(a)-(b) (2004); OR. REv. STAT. § 63.130(1)-(2) (2003).
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(a) Except as provided in subsection (b):
(1) Each member has equal rights in the management and conduct
of the affairs and activities of a limited liability company.
(2) A difference arising as to a matter in the ordinary course of the
affairs and activities of a limited liability company may be decided
by a majority of the members. An act outside the ordinary course
of affairs and activities of a limited liability company may be
undertaken only with the consent of all the members.
(b) In a manager-managedlimited liability company:
(1) Each manager has equal rights in the management and conduct
of the affairs and activities of a limited liability company.
(2) A difference arising as to a matter in the ordinary course of the
affairs and activities of a limited liability company may be decided
by a majority of the managers. An act outside the ordinary course
of affairs and activities of a limited liability company may be
undertaken only with the consent of all the members. 52

At the 2003 Annual Meeting of NCCUSL, this proposal was made
to the floor of Conference. It was met with objections from a number of
the commissioners. For example, one commissioner observed:
Two comments. I guess I don't understand or appreciate why
you're abandoning the default rule. I have a great deal of faith and
esteem for the committee. I will work on that issue myself, or try to
understand that. But it seems to me, as you drafted this, however, you
have left the potential for a void in power, because what you have done
here is, you've taken away the default rule and then you said in the
articles you may delineate power, but somebody may not in fact do
that. It may be silent in the articles. And then
earlier you've taken away
53
the requirement of an operating agreement.

A member of the ReULLCA drafting committee observed:

52 This language is patterned after RUPA, supra note 2, § 4010). Departing from
prior ULLCA § 404(c), the 2003 ReULLCA Proposal did not list particular items that are
outside the ordinary course and reserved to the members.
53 Commissioner David G. Nixon (Arkansas), Annual Meeting of NCCUSL (Aug.
1-7, 2003).
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This is one I think that is going to be very controversial, because I,
for one, am very concerned along the lines of what Commissioner
Nixon has said:
Putting something in a statute that says that nobody has any
apparent authority and saying4 that that meets the expectations of the
public is, to me, very foolish.1

Among the comments made in response to these concerns, was one
ReULLCA reporter's observations:
I want to make a couple of general points and then a specific
comparison with the current law.
I think it is important to underscore that this is at the moment a
very tentative view. We had one meeting. It was suggested that the
reporters were told, go draft something to illustrate what it would look
like. The committee has not-other than in a teleconference to say, yes,
that's an adequate job of showing us sort of what it would look likehas not passed upon it.
Again, it would be a radical departure from two things. One, as
has been indicated twice, the partnership law origins of LLC's. Because
in partnership law, somebody by their status has, and under a statute,
matters a general
has the apparent authority to bind for ordinary
5
partner, be it a limited or general partnership.

Concerns were also raised about the enactability of the new paradigms.
I am very concerned about whether the legislatures will
this, accept the rationale for the change and be willing to
understand
56
accept it.

In response to this low level of criticism, at its next meeting after the
2003 Annual Meeting, the ReULLCA Drafting Committee decided to

-- 54 Commissioner Harry J. Haynsworth, IV (Minnesota), Annual Meeting of
NCCUSL (Aug. 1-7, 2003).
55 Reporter Daniel S. Kleinberger, Annual Meeting of NCCUSL (August 1-7,
2003).
56 Commissioner Nixon, supra note 53.
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revert to the traditional member versus manager-managed paradigm,
even while acknowledging its problems.VI. DEALING WITH (SEVERING?) THE LINKAGE BETWEEN APPARENT
AGENCY AND DECISIONAL AUTHORITY AND PROVIDING LLC
ORGANIZERS WITH STATUTORY STRUCTURES THAT MEET THEIR NEEDS

The preferable solution to the dual problems of linkage between
apparent agency and decisional authority and the inadequacies of the
alternative agency structures is modifying the organic LLC acts to
separate agency and decisional issues and to provide agency and
decisional options that meet the needs of those constituencies using the
structure. But whether those modifications should follow the model
proposed (and rejected) by NCCUSL or some other model remains in
question. Currently, most LLC acts embody the alternative statutory
apparent agency structures of member- or manager-managed. The 2003
ReULLCA Proposal would replace this bilateral situation with a system
in which there is no statutory apparent agency. Rather, agency authority,
either actual or apparent, would be determined without reference to the
fact that the entity in question is an LLC, but instead with reference to
actual business practices and otherwise applicable agency law. Another
alternative would be to modify the LLC act in question to provide a
range of options for agency structure, allowing those forming an LLC to
choose from a menu of options a statutory agency structure that most
closely meets their expectations. For example, such a statute could
provide the prior options of member agency or manager agency, while
adding an option for structuring the LLC in a corporate model with a

board of directors having decisional authority, which could appoint
managers with agency authority. 57 Alternatively, there could be an option
in which there is a board of managers with the members of that board
having, on a collegial but not an individual basis, decisional authority. 8

57 See generally materials presented at THE UNINCORPORATION: OR Ms. DOOLITTLE,
LLC MEETS H. HIGGINS, INC.-WHY CAN'T AN LLC BE MORE LIKE A CORPORATION?,
presented by the ABA Comm. on P'ship. and Unincorporated Bus. Orgs. and the ABA
Comm. on Taxation, Section of Bus. Law (Mar. 24, 2000).
58 See generally J. William Callison, Venture Capital ?nd Corporate Governance:
Evolving the Limited Liability Company to Finance the EntrepreneurialBusiness, 26 J.
CoRp. L. 97 (2000).
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In that situation, apparent agency authority could be restricted to that
same collegial body without vesting agency in any individual manager.
But where should such a menu of options end? Should there be one
in which the agency authority is vested in the members as a collegial
body? Should there be one in which the agency authority is vested only
in those members who hold more than a certain percentage of the
membership interests in the LLC? 59 Should there be one in which agency
authority is vested in persons named in the articles of organization?
Should there be one in which... ?
The statutory drafter and the potential beneficiary of such a statute
are thus faced with the problem of an abundance of riches 6 0 -additional
options impose their own costs in the preparation of the statutory
language, practitioners must differentiate among them to determine
which most closely conforms to the expectations of the organizers, and
the public doing business with LLCs must be educated regarding the
differences between the various options. Further, the cost issues that exist
even with the dual options of member-managed versus managermanaged will continue to exist. While there will be situations in which
one of the expanded menu of options for apparent agency will so closely
match the expectations of the organizers that further customization will
not be necessary, such situations will be fortuitous. The infinite range
organizers' expectations will guarantee that in most circumstances,
regardless of whether the statute provides for two, three, four, five, or

59Such an option does have statutory precedent, albeit in foreign law. Section 7 of
the 1961 Malaysian Partnership Act contemplates a "silent partner" who is without
apparent agency authority. See EL GAILY AHMED EL TAYEB, PRINCIPLES OF PARTNERSHIP
LAW IN MALAYSIA 16, 17 (1998) ("[A]nd the person with whom [the partner] is dealing
either knows that he has no authority or does not believe him to be a partner.") (quoting
MALAYSIAN P'SHP ACT § 7.6 (1961)).
60 As observed by Abbi D'Allanival, "The more alternatives, the more difficult the
choice." See also Barry Schwartz, The Tyranny of Choice, 290 Scn. AM. 70, 70 (2004):
Americans today choose among more options in more parts of life than
has ever been possible before. To an extent, the opportunity to choose enhances
our lives. It is only logical to think that if some choice is good, more is better;
people who care about having infinite options will benefit from them, and those
who do not can always just ignore the 273 versions of cereal they have never
tried. Yet recent research strongly suggests that, psychologically, this
assumption is wrong. Although some choice is undoubtedly better than none,
more is not always better than less.
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even more reasonable options, further customization of the "closest fit"
will be necessary. While a large number of options may minimize the
amount of customization that may be required within the operating
agreement in any particular instance (assuming a statutory option is
relatively close to the desired structure), a large number of options will
impose increased educational costs on the public to learn the various
options and to differentiate among them. 61 At some point such an educational effort will not be effective-in fact it is questionable whether the
public is able to differentiate between the existing member- and
manager-managed structures. Consequently, increasing the number of
statutory options for apparent agency is not a solution to the problem of
how to address apparent agency.
So is the "non-rule". of the rejected ULLCA proposal without
problems? Some would suggest that such a non-rule of apparent agency
will lead to uncertainty, that third parties doing business with an LLC
will have no point of reference from which to determine who has
apparent agency authority. 62 Closer examination shows this to be an
illusory concern. In fact, LLCs and those with whom they do business
already operate in a realm of manifest uncertainty as to who has that
authority. Clearly, the LLC that believes its indication of member- or
manager-managed in its articles of organization has conclusively
identified its agents is misinformed-Scott is still ordering bourbon from
Beth for the LLC of which he is neither a member nor a manager.63 And
it has been shown that the LLC cannot rely upon the alteration of its
management structure to terminate a prior grant of agency authority. At
the same time, the third parties doing business with the LLC must be
concerned both with whether the LLC is member- or manager-managed
and whether the person with whom they are dealing falls within the
managing class. 64 In addition, the determination of whether the person

61

Keeping in mind that inter se allocations of apparent agency must accommodate

the perspective and expectations of the third parties to whom the manifestations will be
made and who must interpret them.
62 See, e.g., supranotes 53-54 and accompanying text.
63 See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
64 As observed by Kleinberger, supra note 55 (discussing revision of section 301):

That is the specific point I want to mention, that currently if someone
comes up to you and says, I'm a member of Walker LLC and based on that
commits the LLC to you, you do not have a claim against the LLC if the LLC's
articles say it is a manger-managed LLC. Because this switching provision cuts
off members' apparent authority to bind if the articles-which, of course, no
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falls within the class having authority should not arise from a
representation by that person but rather by the LLC. It would strain
credibility to suggest that the immeasurable number of interactions that
have and do take place between LLCs and third parties have been
preceded by the due diligence that would, as of that point in time, assure
the third party of the actuality of the apparent authority.65 LLCs are

already operating primarily through generally applicable, and not
statutory, agency law.
At the same time, severing the linkage between apparent agency and
management structure allows the two to be addressed separately and in a
manner that best comports with the expectations and desires of the
organizers. Just as organizers can desire a multitude of models for
agency (although they may not conceptualize it under that rubric), they
may have a similar multitude of models for how they want to allocate
decisional authority in the entity, some of which have been recited
above.
Without linkage to agency, an LLC could be structured with a board
of directors elected or appointed by some or all of the members and each
of those board members could be designated a "manager," all without
vesting apparent agency authority in each individual. An LLC could be
organized without "managers," retaining in the members the authority to
make collective decisions on behalf of the LLC but without retaining
individual apparent agency authority. In that option, apparent agency
authority could be restricted to that same collegial body with the
authority to delegate its authority on a case-by-case basis. Or any
number of other options could be provided.
At this point the question of statutory structure resurfaces. As with
apparent agency, there is an issue regarding the number of necessary
statutory options for management structure. Regardless of the number of
options provided, the problems and costs of customization to match the
expectations of the participants in each venture will not necessarily be

one ever sees, except in very important transactions-if the articles say it's a
manager-managed LLC.
Id. 65 Lawyered transactions that proceed on the basis of resolutions, certificates and
opinion letters are typically accomplished pursuant to actual (as contrasted with apparent)
authority, and fall into a different category than the type of transaction here
contemplated.
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lower if there are more options. While there will be instances in which a
particular statutory option conforms 'precisely

to the desires and

expectations of the participants, such cases will again be fortuitous. In
most circumstances, the actual management structure will need to be
customized in the operating agreement to meet those expectations; as a
result, the abundance of riches problem resurfaces again.
VII. RADICALISM RUNNING AMOK?
The proposal to sever the linkage between statutory apparent agency
and decisional authority already exists in LLC law and, depending upon
your viewpoint, has either been consciously embraced or unconsciously
accepted. The Delaware LLC. Act:

(1) affords each manager and each member the authority to bind
the LLC; and
(2) allows private ordering, by means of the operating
6
agreement, 66 of the limitations upon that grant of authority.67
Outside of organization in the home jurisdiction of the organizer(s),
Delaware is the most likely jurisdiction of organization for an LLC.68
These LLCs, organized in Delaware but doing business throughout the

66

This is not a publicly filed document. In fact, the operating agreement containing

the limitation on apparent agency may be "in the bottom of a locked filing cabinet stuck
in a disused lavatory with a sign on the door saying 'Beware of the Leopard."' DOUGLAS
ADAMS, HITCHHIKER'S GUIDE TO THE GALAXY 9 (2005). Neither Delaware nor Virginia
requires that the Certificate of Formation/Articles of Organization recite whether the LLC
is member- or manager-managed. See supranote 22.
67 The Delaware Code states: "Unless otherwise provided in a limited liability
company agreement, each member and manager has the authority to bind the limited
liability company." DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-402 (2004).
61See generally Lucian Arye Bebehuk & Alma Cohen, Firm's Decisions Where to
Incorporate, 46 J.L & EcON. 383 (Oct. 2003); Brett H. McDonnell, Getting Stuck
Between Bottom and Top: State Competitionfor Corporate Charters in the Presence of
Network Effects, 31 HOFSTRA L. REv. 681, 682 (2003):
For decades, corporate law scholars have been arguing about Delaware.
Roughly half of the largest. corporations in the U.S. choose to incorporate m
Delaware. No other state comes even remotely close to this figure-Delaware.
dominates the competition among states in attracting businesses to incorporate.
Delaware began its domination early in the twentieth century after New Jersey,
the first leader in this competition, faltered. Delaware has never faltered.
Id. (citations omitted).
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nation, operate under a rule of expansive apparent agency authority and
private ordering of limitations. While there is a distinction, between a rule
of no person having statutory apparent agency by reason of position, as
set forth in the 2003 ReULLCA Proposal, and a rule of all persons
having statutory apparent agency by reason of position subject to
limitation by private ordering, that distinction does nothing to give a
third party dealing with an LLC confidence that the person with whom
they are dealing is actually empowered to act for the LLC. At the same
time, while the LLC may have a manager, the manager is not afforded
plenary authority over the management of the LLC; he only has authority
the operating agreement. 9 So the
over those matters entrusted to him in.
Delaware LLC, in expressing its desired management structure in the
operating agreement, is relieved of the need to address default statutory
rules that do not meet its needs through private ordering.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The first generation of LLC acts were drafted under the shadow of
the Kintner regulations, their influence upon agency, and the possible
negative classification consequences if centralized management were
determined to be present. Unfortunately, since the adoption of the
"Check-the-Box" classification regulations, LLC acts have not fully
thrown off the influence of the prior law. We bear the cost of that
continuing influence through the member-managed versus managermanaged system, even though neither is an effective response to the
needs of most persons seeking to organize an LLC. The 2003 ReULLCA
Proposal was intended to address this problem by eliminating the
member- versus manager-managed distinction and separating the issues
of internal decisional authority and external apparent agency. For the
time being, this will not be the means by which this problem is
addressed. Thus, the unfortunate consequences of the linkage remain,
and for now the operating agreement must address them as well as
possible.

69 Delaware law provides: "if a limited liability company agreement provides for the

management, in whole or in part, of a limited liability company by a manager, the
management of the limited liability company, to the extent so provided, shall be vested in
the manager .. "DEL. CO6E ANN. tit. 6, § 18-402.

